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Article 2

THE PRESS AND OUT-OF-COURT CONTEMPT
Is the exercise of out-of-court contempt power on the part
of the courts a step toward limitation upon freedom of discussion and liberty of the press?
This question is not new; its repercussions hark back to
the Star Chamber and the struggle of the English people to
establish free exercise of opinion and distribution of news.
Clearly the press has rights and privileges, but their exercise must not jeopardise the administration of justice, both
press and judiciary agree.
Yet the citations for contempt meted out to the Los
Angeles Times in 1938 ' for a series of editorials point out
1 The Los Angeles Times at the instance of the Los Angeles County Bar Association was cited for contempt for the publication on the following editorials
appearing on the dates noted:
Dec. 21, 1937.
"Sit-Strikers Convicted"
Feb. 13, 1938.
"The Wright Verdict"
April 14, 1938.
"The Fall of an Ex-Queen"
April 16, 1938.
"Jackie's Millions"
May 5, 1938.
"Probation for Gorillas"
June 5, 1938.
"A Black Committee Here"
June 7, 1938.
"Curious Reasoning"
In the last of these editorials, "Curious Reasoning" The Times stated its position in regard to the problem. This editorial was as follows:
"CURIOUS REASONING
"The extraordinary 'contempt of court' action brought in the name of the
Los Angeles Bar Association against the Times is an attempt to reduce to such
narrow limits the right and duty of newspapers to analyze public questions as
practically to destroy their usefulness in that respect.
"The theory which the Bar Association's five-man Contempt Committee appears hastily to have embraced is that no case which is before the courts may be
so analyzed or commented upon until the courts have said their last word upon it.
For example, four of the five Times editorials cited by the committee are classified by it as being 'in contempt of court' because, while they were published after
jury verdicts had been returned, the publication occurred before the judge's disposition of the cases, which were criminal ones, by sentence or otherwise. The
idea seems to be that such comment is calculated to sway the judge one way or the
other so that, as a result, the disposition of the case might thereby be made different from that dictated by its own intrinsic merits.
"This notion is itself scarcely complimentary to the courts which are supposed
to, and usually do, function on the basis of their own best judgment and knowledge of the law, independent of any extraneous influence. It further fails to take
into account the fact that, with few exceptions, the penalties for all classes and
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degrees of crime are fixed by law within such limits as to allow judges comparatively small latitude in which such extraneous influence, were it actually
effective, could operate.
"In the fifth editorial complained of by the Bar Association's committee, The
Times, in common with some hundreds of other newspapers over the country,
expressed its views on the question raised by the litigation over Jackie Coogan's
earnings. In the apparent view of the committee, it was 'contempt' to say that,
in this paper's opinion, children ought to have some rights to and share in the
products of their own labor. The expression of this opinion, the committee seems
to think, should be punished as a wilful effort to influence the court - notwithstanding that the law in the case is perfectly clear, and that it presumably will
be decided according to what the law says and not according to anyone's opinion
as to what it ought to say.
"However, the biggest of the several obvious holes in the committee's contentions is the fact that no legal case is ever finally disposed of until it has been
passed upon by the highest court of jurisdiction to which it is permitted to be
taken. The process of appeal upon appeal often occupies years; the Tom Mooney
case, for example, is not legally settled yet, since the United States Supreme Court
has not yet ruled upon it. This case is more than twenty years old, Mooney has
grown gray in prison, thousand upon thousands of newspaper editorials, books,
pamphlets and argumentative articles have been published for and against his cause.
And, according to the logical projection of the Bar Association committee's curious
reasoning, every one of them is in contempt of court!
"Nearly every great public question is at some time or other the subject of
litigation. Are we to be prohibited from discussing and analyzing such questions
until after the Supreme Court has ruled thereon? Millions of words for and
against the National Recovery and Agricultural Adjustment acts - the most
important statutes in a generation - were published between the time of the
first court attacks on them in 1933 and the time the Supreme Court finally invalidated them some two years later. In that interval they were in the status of
unadjudicated legal cases and, therefore, in the conception of this committee, published argument regarding them must have been in contempt of court and should
have been prevented or punished!
"Realization of the committee's apparent ambition to choke off public discussion of questions which are before the courts would not merely affect newspapers.
It would bar such discussion over the radio by everyone from the President down
and would eliminate from radio programs some of their most constructive material.
Magazine contents would be reduced chiefly to love stories, trade and other publications would be emasculated, political speakers and writers would mostly be
in jail.
"Free discussion of public questions is one our greatest safeguards; efforts to
suppress it one of our greatest perils. Wise decisions are hammered out on the
anvils of debate. Facts are essential, but only thoughtful study and analysis make
them useful. The editorial columns of newspapers are natural leaders of public
discussion. Though the views they express may at times be biased or erroneous,
they are still the stimuli of thought and argument through which just public judgments are finally arrived at. Their privileges can be and sometimes are abused,
but the principle for which they stand is not one lightly to be tampered with."
Demurrers on all counts were overruled except as to the counts based on the
second and fourth editorials. Fines totaling $1,00. were assessed against the
Times-Mirror Company, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, and against officers
of the corporation. See In the Matter of the Times-Mirror Co. et al., 6 U. S.

L. W. 16 (Superior Court Los Angeles County, 1938); 71
6 (Aug. 27, 1938).
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clearly that three is a conflict between the press and the
courts which somewhat overshadows the points of agreement.
And this conflict persists, though over the country generally
the courts have been liberal and tolerant of newspaper coverage of trials, sensing the necessity and the right of liberty
of the press. Neither can it be said that judges on the whole
have been thin-skinned, nor that courts generally have not
been fair-minded and eager to decide the cases before them
fairly and objectively. Where, then, does a conflict arise between the press and the courts? Comparatively recent events
will serve as an excellent introduction to the problem.
Three years ago the trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann
having come to a bedraggled close at Flemington, New Jersey, the whole question of the press and the administration
of justice seemingly was scheduled for public trial by public
demand, but today it languishes apparently forgotten. And
in the three years since Flemington, wars have raged, nations have tottered, and thrills and anguish have chased each
other through the columns of the newspapers and along the
radio channels. The past is no match for the living present,
but a glance backward reveals the Hauptmann affair standing alone, the last splotch in a series of national sensations.
There is no reason to suppose that the series is at an end or
that another sensation is not somewhere in the making. But
could the courts, the press, and even the public, countenance
another farce such as that at Flemington?
It would seem appropriate, then, that in a period of comparative public sanity, the problem of press and the administration of justice be examined anew, beginning at the point
to which it last had advanced in the months after the Hauptmann trial, namely the committee for press-bar-radio cooperation.2
2 Full title, "Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar,
as to Publicity Interfering with Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings." The report is printed in 62 REPORT OF THE AmsRIcAN BAR AssocIATioN,
851-66 (1937).
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Composed of members of the bar and representatives of
the two dominant publishers' associations,' the committee
built its report around seven points covering in general court
room crowding and disturbances, departure of attorneys from
legal ethics in out-of-court statements, and a consideration
of limitations which might be imposed in regard to accounts
of court room occurrences. As might be expected the committee found itself unable to agree upon a categorical statement covering this last point. The press representatives were
firm in their conviction that such a statement, if not impossible, was certainly not necessary. If anything is wrong or
whatever is wrong, the press representatives contended, it
can be quite easily corrected by the courts and -their officials
not by limitations upon reporting but through the insistence upon court room dignity and decorum.4
No one doubts that making a vaudeville act or a burlesque
out of the orderly administration of justice in the court room,
whether by press or by certain over-enthusiastic attorneys,
clearly defiles court procedure and makes a mockery of
justice. The remedy for such evils lies within the power of
the courts themselves, although some elective judges may
hestitate to cite for contempt the reporters of newspapers
strongly entrenched in the local community. The appearance
of the radio as a news agency and the increasing emphasis
upon pictorial journalism, however, offer new problems which
as yet have not been explored satisfactorily beyond the position that a court may forbid the -taking of photographs in
the court or so near as to disturb the court or to place a defendant not yet proved guilty in an embarrassing position
while yet under the protection of the court.' But may this
3 The American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society
of Newspaper Editors.
4 For a survey of opinions of leading newspapermen, see Reform of Trial

Publicity May Result from Bar-Press Cooperation, 69
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3-4. (Feb. 22, 1936.)
5 In Ex parte Sturm, 192 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927), Urner, J. stated:
"The challenge in this case of the court's right to forbid the use of cameras

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

not in time place the courts in the position of discriminating
against the picture newspapers and journals as compared
with the standard newspapers? Conceivably the same problem may be raised by the radio, and certainly with these new
agencies of public information the question of out-of-court
contempt must necessarily grow in importance.
And there the matter stands, leaving a very real question
unanswered - does society require that any further restrictions be imposed to meet these problems?
Moderate opinion, unprejudiced by any new outbreak of
sensationalism by a certain element of the press, would seem
generally to be satisfied with present arrangements. At least
there is no great unrest. "On the whole," says one observer
in surveying the relations of bench and press, "newspapers
have as much freedom from domination by judicial powers
as they need." I Taken literally, it may be said that newspapers in general agree with this statement, but they are not
unaware of a growing tendency on the part of courts to exercise their contempt power to punish newspapers.
Upon this issue clashes have come with increasing frequency. For more than 100 years in the United States there
has been a remarkable assumption of power by the courts to
punish summarily for publications out of court.7 And this
has taken place although there is real reason to doubt that
there exists an "inherent power" to punish out-of-court pubin the courtroom during the progress of the trial presents an issue of vital importance. If such a right should yield to an asserted privilege of the press, the
authority and dignity of the courts would be seriously impaired. It is essential
to the integrity and independence of the judicial tribunals that they should have
the power to enforce their own judgment as to what conduct is compatible with.
the proper and orderly course of their procedure. If their discretion should be
subordinated to that of a newspaper manager in regard to the use of photographic

instruments in the courtroom, it would be difficult to limit the further reduction
to which the authority of the courts would be exposed. It would be utterly inconsistent with the position and prerogatives of the judiciary, as a co-ordinate
branch of government, to require its submission to the judgment of a non-governmental agency as to a question of proper conduct in the judicial forums."
6 L. N. Flint, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NEWSPAPER, (1925) p. 110.
7 For a comprehensive survey, see two articles by Walter Nelles and Carol
W. King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COL. L. REv. 401, 525.
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lications.' True, in the application of this "inherent power"

the general rule is to allow almost unlimited newspaper comment when a case is no longer pending, but it must be remembered that the court in a contempt case decides the
pendency of the action for the reporting of which the contempt charge was made. Further, the court decides whether

the publication, regardless of its truth, has "reasonable tendencies" to prejudice or obstruct the orderly administration
of justice.9 This is rather strong medicine for a free press, so
strong that it would scarcely seem that new regulations are
needed for curbing the press.
An unchecked judiciary itself might sometime become a
threat.10 At any rate it appears more reasonable to set some
bounds beyond which an unscrupulous; or perhaps only a

jealous court, might not go in some situation which in truth
urgently needed public attention. 1 Strict insistence upon a
narrow interpretation of the "pendency" of a cause, under
certain conditions, could make the administration of justice
a mockery, even as unlimited leniency - some critics suggest

connivance.
8

2

This is not to say that the press has need as

Sir John Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, (1927).

9 See Toledo Newspaper Co., v. U. S., 247 U. S. 402 (1918).
10 "Liberty of the press is subordinate to the independence of the judiciary.."
6 R. C. L. 510. See especially Francis v. People of Virgin Islands, 11 F. (2nd) 860
(1926). Here the publication for which Francis was punished for contempt was a
protest, after final judgment, against a conviction for a libel of which Wooley, C. J.
on review in reversing the libel action but in affirming the contempt action said:
"Clearly the trial judge in reaching his judgment did not confine himself
to the defendant's publication . . . but availed himself of the publication to exercise a control over the press in the interest, no doubt, of the public good; yet it is
equally clear such is not his function." Thus Francis was in contempt for protesting a wrongful conviction!
11 "It is regarded as an interference with the true work of the courts to
publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept private." Ibid.
p. 514. "That i person may have observed some act done by officials of the law,
which he has not sworn to keep secret, does not justify him in publishing it at
large. It is the duty of a citizen to assist, and not to frustrate, the work of the
administration of justice." U. S. v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 Fed. 524, 528
(1917). See also ex rel Schmidt v. Gehrz, 178 Wis. 130, 189 N. W. 461 (1922).
12 "The plain truth is that if the press is making a scandal out of our treatment of crime... it is doing so only to the extent to which our officers of justice
are willing, and frequently eager, to have it do so." Paul Hutchinson, Why Blame
It on the Papers, Sc aNEs, Vol. 99, p. 43. (Jan. 1936.)
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a news purveyor actually to interfere with the orderly adminstration of justice. But it may well be pointed out, in view
of the conflict between the majority and minority rule, that
there is a wide and important difference - even vital difference - between "having a tendency to interfere" and
"actually interfering" with the orderly adminstration of justice as applied to publications out of court."3
Let us suppose, for the moment, that the committee for
press, bar and radio cooperation in 1936 had formulated a
categorical statement covering the reporting of court cases.
What might this statement have included - that reporters
of less than five years' experience be forbidden to cover
courts, or that any vivid or colorful story shall be contemptuous?'" Perhaps the newspaper men might have suggested
ironically that a description of the antics of some attorneys
in the course of the trial of a cause be punished as contempt
in that the report lowered the dignity of the court and the
respect for the administration of justice. The possibilities
are unlimited, and lead to the suspicion that society may
stand to lose, rather than gain, by encouragement of limitations upon news writing.15 Publicity wielded as a weapon in
the interest of the public is one safeguard society cannot well
afford to lose. It follows then that no further encouragement
should be given for the extension of the doctrine of contempt
through publications "having a tendency to interfere with
13 Two cases demonstrating the minority rule, that is that "actual" obstruction must occur before contempt will lie - a view most acceptable to newspapers - are: State v. American News Co., 64 South Dakota 385, 266 N. W.
827 (1936); Herald-Republican Publishing Co., v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 Pac.
624 (1913).
14 In 1927 a committee of the American Bar Association declared that "too
much of the drime and court news, instead of being an accurate and objective
report of the outstanding facts, is a highly colored report in which the play of
imagination, exaggeration, effusion, distortion, deduction, conjecture, prediction
and all the secondary mental processes are often exercised upon primary physical
facts by ingenious reporters." Leon R. Yankwich, 19 A. B. A. J., 51 ff.
15 As for the criticism of "colored" news writing, it has often been pointed
out that every individual "colors" everything he sees in accordance with his
own experiences. See Walter Lippman, PUBXC OPINiON. If the "coloring" should
be regarded as a matter of degree, who would measure it and how would this be
done ?
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the administration of justice," and certainly not by suggesting that the doctrine might be extended to actual reporting
of trials.'"
What shall be said of the criticism of courts in the newspaper columns as constituting interference with 'the orderly
administration of justice?
The majority rule has tended steadily to take a more unyielding position against criticism of a court "while a cause
is pending." This is to claim for all courts a certain righteousness, a certain negation of error which public opinion is not
as yet prepared to recognize. Why, indeed, should all courts
be immune?" If a court does err in its way and if it does
appear that the court has fallen victim to the influences or
prejudices which sometimes play upon supposedly less impartial citizens, what agency of public information is better
qualified to bring the error to public attention? Closely allied
to this are the many suggestions for reform of the whole
system of administration of justice.' The irony of the situation appears when it is realized that the press is supposed to
bear the brunt of the-drive for public enlightenment. And in
the performance of this service, any newspaper man can draw
upon his experiences to show that if public pressure for the
improvement of a situation is to be had, academic discussion
16 "The repetition of what had been seen does not jeopardize any right. Let
us not pretend that it does, whether our reason be legal snobbery or Fascist
tyranny." Col. Robert R. McCormick, speaking to the Chicago Bar Association.
See report in The Chicago Tribune, Dec. 11, 1938.
17 "Bad courts should not be respected. Good courts, even, should not be
respected in their aberrations. Public discussion outside of court rooms, at such
times as it is most likely to command attention, is the nearest we have to a practical means of working for consistent judicial respectability." Nelles and King,
COL. L. REV., op. cit. 7, p. 533.
18 One of the most recent plans for press cooperation to effect judicial reform was revealed by John H. Wigmore, dean emeritus of Northwestern university
law school, in an address to the Chicago Bar Association. He would focus public
opinion upon the appointment of federal judges. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 4, 1938.
J. Edgar Hoover has advocated that the press carry educational "crime columns" to

give the public preventive information in the manner that medical information is
imparted. 70 EDoIR AND PuBLISHER (April 24, 1937). For criticism of slowness

of judicial reform, see Dr. Robert E. Cushman, Our Antiquated Judicial System,
AmAis (September, 1935).
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of problems isn't likely to be efficacious. Specific situations,
while they are situations, must be had. The majority rule,
strictly applied, would limit discussions while a cause is pending. In the words of a recent law journal article: "there are
no limits to the scope of the summary power in constructive
contempt beyond the fertile imagination of the judiciary...
Under such a rule, practically every law review in the country risks contempt whenever reference is made to a suit in
which there may subsequently be an appeal, a rehearing, or
any further motions." "9Reform will indeed be slow in making headway if the admitted sins of the press are permitted
to create a screen behind which the sins of the judiciary may
perpetuate themselves through a further extension of the
majority rule.
And now, since we have referred directly to the admitted
sins of the press, it might be well to examine these briefly
apart from the subject of contempt. The observer who ponders the sudden explosion of a "big story" in the press must
sometimes doubt that all that he reads has been revealed
"for the public good." o20
He may become critical of the historical explanation of freedom of the press, and eventually
conclude that some of the things he reads can find little
justification in a constitutional right."' He may perceive further that there is not only a sin of commission, but a sin of
omission.22 But upon reflection he is likely to realize that the
more serious sins of commission are relatively infrequent and
19

Recent Limitations on Free Speech and Free Press, 48 YALE LAW JOURNAL,

54 at 65.
20 From the 10 AuSTRALuAx L. J., No. 1 may be cited a common, ill-defined
und debatable criticism: "The daily press, in conformity with its policy of giving
the public what it wants rather than what it needs, published very full accounts

of the trial ....."
21 For two interesting discussions see: Helen MacGill Hughes, The Lindbergh
Case: a study of Human Interest and Politics, 42 Ams. J. oF Soc., 32; and Sidney
Kobre, The Newspapers and the Zangara Case, a study of American Crime Reporting, 13 JOURNALISm QuARTmLY, 253.
22 "The newspapers had . . . an extraordinary opportunity to present the

important news behind the surface facts - to mold public thought and action
In a social, constructive pattern . . . The facts . . . in my opinion, show that
they failed." The Newspapers and the Zangara Case, op. cit. 21, p. 271.

THE PRESS AND OUT-OF-COURT CONTEMPT

chargeable to a limited number of newspapers,2 while the
sin of omission is perhaps an every day occurrence. However, no one needs to point out this situation to the press.
Newspaper men have been as quick to recognize these weaknesses as any critic, and they feel no more satisfaction than
does any one else in an explanation which makes use of the
fact that the press is, after all, a business enterprise. But
the truth is - only the more uncharitable deny it - that
shrinking from public service for business considerations is
a relatively rare occurrence.24 Still another factor is that a
newspaper can go no further nor no faster than its readers
will permit while maintaining a two-fold standard for the
press - speed and entertainment. Speed precludes satisfactory research for interpretative material, no matter how
commendable the ideals of a particular newspaper may be,2"
while in the providing of entertainment the press often finds
itself accused of two faults - triviality in choice of some
material and invasion of an individual's privacy in the disproportionate display of certain stories. The latter is the
more serious charge for it portrays the press as an agency
of persecution, a picture which is not entirely complete, but,
newspapers are not as a rule the instigators of ruthless
investigations. They follow the leads of law enforcing
agencies.26
And yet no one can ignore new problems inherent in the
relations between pictorial journalism and the administra23 "If any form of governmental censorship or regulation comes into being,
it will be forced into existence by the failure of a few newspapers to comply with
the prevailing code of ethics. It would be a very unfortunate thing for all of us
if such a condition should come to pass." Radio speech of Gov. Harold G. Hoffman, of New Jersey. 69 EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, 16 (July 4, 1936).
24 L. N. Flint, op. cit. 6, p. 98 et seq.
25 Progress is being 'made, however, one indication of which is the widespread use of interpretative columns which are offering background information
on national and international developments.
26
The American Society of Newspaper Editors rejected a resolution stating
that "we deplore the hounding and persecution by newspapers of persons mentioned
in connection with crimes but not formally accused of crimes" on the ground that
often the hounding was not an activity of the newspaper. For report of the meeting, see 70 EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, 21. (April 24, 1937.)
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tion of justice. The camera in its product as well as in its
use tends to excesses. To take photographs of the principals,
the court, the attorneys, and the jury during the trial not
only disturbs the court but also might easily hamper the orderly processes of justice. There is no obligation upon the
newspaper to print all the stories and the pictures submitted
and so one particularly human interest photograph prejudicial to the defendants might be used, but another which
would be on its face favorable to the defendant left out. The
full case as seen by the jury would not necessarily appear in
the press, but one damaging photograph could conceivably
through the newspaper get back to the jury despite precautions and judicial restriction. The danger of such unfavorable photographing also can be seen in important civil cases
in which the jury are allowed to return to their homes every
night. Such is the nature of the problems raised by the
camera. Must new forms of control be called forth, and perhaps extended to the straight news agencies? Are they really
necessary? The press can easily point to the experiences of
those peoples who have tampered with their constitutional
guarantees of free press and speech.
And now by way of summary let us say that - First, the
press does have its ills, but there is no reason to believe that
a major operation by an outside agency - legislative 2 ' or
executive - is called for; second, although the press enjoys a workable freedom for reporting proceedings dealing
with the administration of justice, there has appeared a dangerous and generally unnecessary extension of judicial power to punish for contempt for publications outside of court
27 After considerable research the authors of this article believe that the
judicial authority is generally sufficient to control contemptuous out-of-court publications that actually interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of
justice to the point of an effective possibility. It is realized that legislative restrictions for -example on the spreading of rumors about financial institutions thereby
affecting their credit are representative of sane social legislation; however, this
problem is not a question of contempt in relation to newspaper reports and/or
comments on pending trials. It would seem likewise that it would be sensible legislation to require that in labor cases before the court contempts for out-of-court
indirect violations of judicial orders should be decided by a jury.
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on the ground that these "have a tendency to interfere"
with the work of the court; third, the press doesn't want
actually to interfere with the administration of just-ice, but
on the other hand, the administration of justice needs the
disciplinary and reforming influence of the press; and fourth,
extension of limitations upon the press, other than by an
enlightened judiciary, in either reporting or camera work
outside the courtroom, would involve risks too dangerous to
be ventured.
Niel Plummer.
Frank Thayer.
Madison, Wisconsin.

